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Abstract
In this chapter, a more memory-efficient method for encoding binary information into
words of prescribed length and weight is presented. The solutions in existing work include
complex float point arithmetic or extra memory overhead which make it demanding for
resource-constrained computing platform. The solution we propose here solves the prob-
lems above yet achieves better coding efficiency. We also correct a crucial error in previous
implementations of code-based cryptography by exploiting and tweaking the proposed
encoder. For the time being, the design presented in this work is the most compact one for
any code-based encryption schemes. We show, for instance, that our lightweight implemen-
tation of Niederreiter encrypting unit can encrypt approximately 1 million plaintexts per
second on a Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA, requiring 183 slices and 18 memory blocks.
Keywords: code-based cryptography, McEliece/Niederreiter cryptosystem, constant
weight coding, FPGA implementation
1. Introduction
Most modern public-key cryptographic systems rely on either the integer factorization or
discrete logarithm problem, both of which expect to be solvable on large-scale quantum
computers using Shor’s algorithm [1]. The recent breakthroughs of powerful quantum com-
puting have shown their strength in computing solutions to the hard mathematical problems
mentioned [2, 3]. The cryptographic research community has identified the urgency of insecure
vulnerabilities rooted in these cryptosystems and begun to settle their security on alternative
hard problems in the last years, such as multivariate-quadratic, lattice-based, and code-based
cryptosystems [4]. In this chapter, we address the problem of encoding information into binary
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words of predefined length and Hamming weight in resource-constrained computing envi-
ronment, e.g., reconfigurable hardware, embedded microcontroller systems, etc. This is of
interest, in particular, of efficient implementations of McEliece’s scheme [5, 6] or Niederreiter’s
scheme [7], the most prospective candidates for code-based cryptography.
In the case of Niederreiter/McEliece encryption, the binary stream of plaintext is requested to
be converted into the form of constant weight words. Constant weight means that there exists
a constant number of “1” in the binary plaintext. Note that in the hybrid Niederreiter encryp-
tion systems (KEM/DEM encryption) [8–10], KEMs are designed to exchange symmetric keys
securely, and DEMs use these symmetric keys for transmitting long messages. This class of
encryption techniques does not get constant weight coding involved. Nevertheless, if we want
to construct a complete code-based cryptography including standard public-key encryption,
digital signature, and hybrid encryption, constant weight coding must be efficiently
implemented as it is required by both public-key encryption [11, 12] and signature [13]. The
exact solution [14] of constant weight coding needs to compute large binomial coefficients and
has a quadratic complexity though it is assumed to be optimal as a source coding algorithm. In
[15], Sendrier proposed the first solution of linear complexity by incorporating Huffman codes.
Later, the author of [15] further improves its coding efficiency very close to 1 by means of
Goloumb’s run-length encoding [16]. The new proposal is particularly easy to implement on
hardware and has linear time complexity. The disadvantage though is that the length encoding
is variable [17]. He also proposed an approximation version in this paper by regulating the
value of d to the power of two. This approach significantly simplifies the encoding procedure
and thus improves coding throughput.
Heyse et al. [18, 19] continued the research and proposed to adapt the approximation method
in [17] to embedded system applications. Their design is implemented on AVR microcontrollers
and Xilinx FPGAs. However, we observe that such method is not applicable to large parameter
sets for the Niederreiter scheme (see Table 1) [20–22]. The work in [18, 19] preserves a lookup
table of pre-stored data with the space complexity of O nð Þ to encode input messages into
constant weight words. The memory overhead of this table is still intolerable for small embed-
ded systems, and therefore their design is unscalable if n is large. CFS signature scheme [20]
exploits very large Goppa code, and it requires to compress the lengthy constant weight signa-
tures into a binary stream. MDPC-McEliece/Niederreiter encryption [23] uses very large n for
practical security levels. For instance, n is set as large as 19,712 for 128-bit security and 65,536 for
256-bit security. Baldi et al. proposed a novel LDGM sparse syndrome signature scheme [13]
with compact key size, which also requests a large constant weight coding within the signature
generation. His methodwas successfully attacked in 2016 by a French research group [24]. At the
time being, we do not have a considerably lightweight yet efficient solution for the constant
weight encoding if we consider realizing such encoding in real-world applications.
The purpose of this work is to tweak Sendrier’s approximation method [17] and hence to make
it easy to implement for all possible secure parameters of the Niederreiter cryptosystem
proposed in literature while maintaining the efficiency. Our contributions include:
1. We propose a new approximation method of constant weight coding free from complicated
float point arithmetic and heavy memory footprint. This method permits us to implement a
compact yet fast constant weight encoder on the resource-constrained computing platform.
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2. We improve the coding efficiency by fine-tuning the optimal precision for computing the
value of d, in comparison with other approximation methods. The experiments have
shown that the performance of our new method is better than Heyse’s approximate
version [18] and even comparable to Sendrier’s original proposal [17].
3. We integrate our design with the Niederreiter encryption and obtain a more compact
result. We fix a critical security flaw of Heyse et al.’s Niederreiter encryptor [19]. Our
secure implementation of Niederreiter encryptor can encrypt approximately 1 million
plaintexts per second on a Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA, requiring 183 slices and 18 memory
blocks.
This chapter is organized as follows. Sendrier’s proposal of constant weight coding and its
approximation variant [17, 18] is first revisited in Section 2. After analyzing the downside of
these schemes, we are motivated to propose a new approximation method and to fine-tune it for
an optimal source coding performance, presented in Section 3. Our detailed implementations
for the proposed constant weight encoder/decoder and Niederreiter encryption unit on FPGAs
are described in Section 4 and Section 5. We present our experimental results compared with the
state of arts in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarizes this chapter.
2. Sendrier’s methods for constant weight coding
Sendrier presented an algorithm for encoding binary information into words of prescribed
length and weight [17]. His encoding algorithm returns a t-tuple δ1; δ2;…; δtð Þ in which δi s are
the lengths of the longest strings of consecutive “0”s. This method is easy to implement and
has linear complexity with a small loss of information efficiency. In this work, we unfold the
n; tð Þ Security
level
Application Coding
system
Public/secret key size
(kbits)
Prestored data for CW coding
(kbits)
1024; 38ð Þ 60 bit Encryption Goppa code 239=151:4 4
2048; 27ð Þ 80 bit Encryption Goppa code 507=108:3 8
2690; 57ð Þ 128 bit Encryption Goppa code 913=182:4 10.5
6624; 117ð Þ 256 bit Encryption Goppa code 7488/2268.5 25.9
65536; 9ð Þ 80 bit Signature Goppa code 9000/1019 256
262144; 9ð Þ 80 bit Signature Goppa code 40,500/4525 1024
1048576; 8ð Þ 80 bit Signature Goppa code 160,000/20,025 4096
9800; 18ð Þ 80 bit Signature LDGM code 936/— 19.1
24960; 23ð Þ 120 bit Signature LDGM code 4560/— 58.4
46000; 29ð Þ 160 bit Signature LDGM code 13,480/— 117.2
19712; 134ð Þ 128 bit Encryption MDPC code 9.6/— 77
65536; 264ð Þ 256 bit Encryption MDPC code 32/— 256
Table 1. Parameters recommended used in the Niederreiter cryptosystem, referenced partly from [13, 19, 23, 25].
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recursive encoding and decoding algorithms originated from [17] and rewrite them in Algo-
rithm 1 and Algorithm 2 [26].
We use the same notations from [17, 26] in the above two algorithms to keep consistency. For
example, read B; ið Þ moves forward and reads i bits in the stream B and returns the integer
whose binary decomposition has been read, most significant bit first; Write B; ið Þ moves for-
ward and writes the binary string i into the stream B; and encodefd δindex; dð Þ returns a binary
string and decodefd d;Bð Þ returns an integer. These two functions are actually the run-length
encoding and decoding methods proposed by Golomb [16, 17]. best_d n; tð Þ returns an integer
such that 1 ≤ best_d n; tð Þ ≤n t and Sendrier suggested to choose it close to the number
defined by Eq. (1). In fact, best_d n; tð Þ can take any value in the range though the efficiency
would be reduced if this value is too far from Eq. (1):
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d ¼ n
t 1
2
 
1
1
2
1
t
 
(1)
Sendrier also presented an approximation of the best d where the values of d (given by Eq. (1))
was restricted to the power of two [17]. More precisely, d is first computed via Eq. (1) and then
round to 2 log 2 dð Þd e. This approximation greatly simplifies the functions of encodefd ð Þ and
decodefd ð Þ and therefore outperforms in speed, while the loss of coding efficiency is trivial.
The simplified versions of encoding and decoding with encodefd ð Þ and decodefd ð Þ after
approximation are described as follows [26]:
encodefd δ; dð Þ ¼ base2 δ; uð Þ (2)
decodefd d;Bð Þ ¼ read B; uð Þ (3)
where base2 δ; uð Þ denotes the u least significant bits of the integer δ written in base 2 and
u ¼ log 2 dð Þd e. For the above two equations, the minimum allowed value of d is noteworthy
in the case of d ¼ 1. In this case we have u ¼ 0, and therefore we define by purpose that
base2 δ; 0ð Þ ¼ null and read B; 0ð Þ ¼ 0 to guarantee that our algorithm applies to all possible u.
Recently, Heyse et al. implemented Niederreiter encryption scheme on embedded microcon-
trollers in which they used a lookup table to compute the value of d for constant weight
encoding [18]. Their method is based on the approximation method from [17]. One major
contribution of their work is they observe that the last few bits of n can be ignored for constant
weight encoding because these bits make little difference to the value of d. They do not keep
n  t entries but instead n entries; the least significant log 2td e bits of n are not considered and
are substituted by t. This method significantly reduces the size of the lookup table. According
to our analysis, the lookup table is shrunk to roughly O nð Þ. It works pretty well for small
parameters of n, for example, n ¼ 211 in the applications of Goppa code-based McEliece or
Niederreiter encryption schemes. However, we occasionally found that it does not work well
when we were implementing a Niederreiter signature scheme, called CFS signature. CFS
requires an extremely large value of n, typically n ¼ 218, n ¼ 220. On the one hand, the size of
lookup table increases linearly with n, resulting in somewhat unscalability. On the other hand,
the coding efficiency drops dramatically and thus lowers the throughput of the constant
weight encoder as n increases. All these downsides motivate us to figure out better ways of
computing d. We would describe and analyze our new methods in the next section.
3. Proposed approximation method of d
3.1. Reduce memory footprint and computational steps
The computation of the value of d is the most crucial step of constant weight encoding and
decoding, as suggested by Eq. (1) which involves floating-point arithmetic. However, many
embedded/hardware systems do not have dedicated floating-point units for such computations.
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[19] proposed to replace floating-point units by a lookup table with predefined data for
reconfigurable hardware. The problem of their method is that, for some large n; tð Þ, the lookup
table could be sizeable. For example, n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
requests the size of lookup table to be
256 kb, which is obviously not a negligible memory overhead for embedded systems.
To solve this problem, we propose to eliminate such lookup table by computing d directly
using fixed-point arithmetic. We separate the computation of d into two parts. In the first part,
θ t½  ¼ 1 1=2
1
t
 
is precomputed and stored in the fixed-point format. In the second part,
n  t12
 
 θ is then efficiently calculated by a fixed-point multiplier. In this fashion we notably
shrink the size of lookup table from O nð Þ to O tð Þ [26].
Furthermore, we substitute n  t12
 
by n due to the following observations [26]:
• n≫ t such that n  t12 ≈ n.
• Eventually d must be round to an integer, and hence the difference between n  t12
 
θ
and nθ is very likely to be ignored.
This substitution enables the removal of the computational steps of n  t  1ð Þ=2, and hence a
faster and simpler realization of constant coding which makes use of a single integer multipli-
cation is achievable.
In summary, our new proposal of the approximation of d is as follows [26]:
d ¼ n  θ t½ b c (4)
where θ t½  ¼ 1 1=2
1
t
 
is a function of t and precomputed. Our new approximation of d is
lightweight, requiring only one multiplication. In the following, we will demonstrate that this
method also permits reasonable high-coding efficiency as a source coding algorithm.
3.2. Represent θ t½  in fixed-point format
As aforementioned, θ t½  is actually a vector of fractional numbers and should be stored in
fixed-point format. Note that the integer part of θ t½  is always 0, and therefore we only need to
preserve its fractional part. Hereafter, we denote our fixed-point format as fixed_0_i, where i
indicates the bits we have used for storing the fractional part of θ t½ .
In practice, we hope to use fixed_0_i with the smallest i while maintaining desirable coding
efficiency [26]. Smaller i means lower data storage and a simpler multiplication with smaller
operand size, which is particularly advisable for resource-constrained computing platforms.
Indeed, one of the key issues of this chapter is to determine the best fixed_0_i for θ t½ . In the
next section, we describe our experiments on exploring the optimal fixed_0_i.
3.3. Find the optimal precision for constant weight encoding
The purpose of the precision tuning is to find the lowest precision that still maintains a
relatively high coding efficiency. A lower precision means we can use a multiplier of smaller
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operand size leading to better path delay and slice utilization. A higher coding efficiency
means one can encode more bits from the source into a constant weight word. This is of
interest, in particular, when someone encrypts a relatively large file using code-based crypto:
It takes much less time for encryption if we have a high coding efficiency close to 1 [26].
To find the optimal precision of fixed_0_i, we studied the relationship between distinct i’s and
their coding performance. In our experiments, all possible precision from fp_0_32 to fp_0_1 are
investigated to compare with the Sendrier’s methods [17] and Heyse’s approximate version [18].
Figure 1. The performance of different methods for choosing the optimal d. We have listed five most frequently used sets
of n; tð Þ for the Niederreiter cryptosystem. We have done three experiments for each n; tð Þ in which the input binary
message contains “1”with the probability p = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. The results of each experiment are obtained by
running 10,000 different messages. The X-axis lists different methods including Senderier’s primitive [17], Senderier’s
approximation [17], Heyse’s approximation [19], and our n*fixed_0_16— N*fixed_0_2. The Y-axis represents the average
length (bits) of the input message read for a successful constant weight encoding.
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We measured the coding efficiency by calculating the average coding length for a successful
encoding because longer coding length indicates a better coding efficiency. Since constant
weight coding is variable length coding, we must consider how different plaintexts as input
could affect the performance in order to determine which approximation is the best. To be
thorough, different types of binary plaintexts, classified by the proportion of “1” contained,
should be tested for evaluating the real performance of different encoding approximation
methods. In our instances, we measure three particular types to simplify the model: “0”
dominated texts (p = 0.1, “1” exists with probability of 0.1 in the plaintext), balanced texts
(p = 0.5, “1” exists with probability of 0.5), and “1” dominated texts (p = 0.9, “1” exists with
probability of 0.9) (Figure 1).
Figure 2 describes the coding performances when we adjust the precision of θ t½ . Taken as a
whole, the p = 0.1 group and the p = 0.5 group have a similar trend of average message length
encoded as the arithmetic precision decreases: The message length drops slightly from
n*fixed_0_16— n*fixed_0_2 in consistency. On the contrary, the p = 0.9 group appears to be quite
different where the numbers of bits read for a single constant weight coding first stay stable and
Figure 2. best_d module for CW encoder and decoder. We list here the detailed configurations of n ¼ 211, t ¼ 27 for
demonstrative purpose.
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then drop with the approximation precision decreasing. The numbers first keep stable because
the loss of precision in θ t½  is comparatively trivial but if the precision drops too low, for instance,
with fixed_0_2 representation θ t½  ¼ 0 for 2 ≤ t ≤ 38 and hence d ¼ 0. It leads to a constant n and
small value of i in Algorithm 3 forcing us to read more bits of input stream before the algorithm
halts. According to the evaluation criteria mentioned in the last paragraph, we compute the
average length of the three types of plaintexts and identify the best approximation of d from
our proposal after analyzing the statistics obtained. On the one hand, the n*fixed_0_5 group
outperforms at n ¼ 210; t ¼ 38
 
and n ¼ 211; t ¼ 27
 
. On the other hand, the n*fixed_0_4 group
beats the others at n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
, n ¼ 218; t ¼ 9
 
, and n ¼ 220; t ¼ 8
 
.
Table 2 compares our proposed methods with the Sendrier’s [17], Sendrier’s original approx-
imation using power of 2 [17], and Heyse’s table lookup approximation [18]. From this table, it
is seen that our proposal gains better coding efficiency than the original approximation and
Heyse’s approximation among all five parameter sets used for the Niederreiter scheme. Note
that the average number of bits we have to read before producing the constant weight words is
n t Method Number of bits read Coding efficiency Efficiency improved
Maximum Minimum Average
210 38 Sendrier’s [17] 236 164 214.70 93.19% —
Sendrier’s approx. [17] 263 124 210.45 91.32% 1.98%
Heyse’s approx. [19] 261 143 210.73 91.44% 1.85%
n*fixed_0_5 311 183 225.54 97.89% +5.05%
211 27 Sendrier’s [17] 208 160 194.46 95.51% —
Sendrier’s approx. [17] 227 119 187.55 92.11% 3.56%
Heyse’s approx. [19] 224 127 190.96 93.78% 1.80%
n*fixed_0_5 361 132 196.30 96.41% +0.95%
216 9 Sendrier’s [17] 133 113 124.87 99.50% —
Sendrier’s approx. [17] 133 77 117.80 93.84% 5.10%
Heyse’s approx. [19] 133 86 116.34 92.68% 6.83%
n*fixed_0_4 135 95 121.98 97.20% 2.37%
218 9 Sendrier’s [17] 148 132 142.61 99.38% —
Sendrier’s approx. [17] 151 91 135.17 94.18% 5.22%
Heyse’s approx. [19] 300 101 133.21 92.81% 6.60%
n*fixed_0_4 154 112 139.64 97.31% 2.08%
220 8 Sendrier’s [17] 149 135 144.00 99.52% —
Sendrier’s approx. [17] 151 99 136.94 94.64% 4.90%
Heyse’s approx. [19] 265 17 110.07 76.07% 23.56%
n*fixed_0_4 158 109 140.81 97.31% 2.22%
Table 2. The coding performance of the optimal d chosen from our approximation method.
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upper bound by log 2
n
t
 
, and the thus the ratio of the average number read and the upper
bound measures the coding efficiency [17]. Additionally, our proposal even outperforms the
Sendrier’s method at two of these parameter sets— n ¼ 210; t ¼ 38
 
and n ¼ 211; t ¼ 27
 
with
5.05 and 0.95% of improvements, respectively. It is also worth mentioning that for
n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
, n ¼ 218; t ¼ 9
 
, and n ¼ 220; t ¼ 8
 
, the performance of our proposal falls
slightly behind with 2.37, 2.08, and 2.22% of loss when compared with the Sendrier’s method;
it nonetheless outruns Sendrier’s approximation and Heyse’s approximation. In particular, the
performance of Heyse’s approximation becomes unfavorable with 23.56% loss at
n ¼ 220; t ¼ 8
 
, and we are pushing the limits of Heyse’s method here as the lower bits of n
are innegligible and cannot be removed with such large n.
4. Proposed constant weight encoder and decoder
4.1. best_d module
The best_d module is the most critical arithmetic unit which computes the best value of d
according to the inputs n and t. Our proposal of computation of best_d consists of three stages
which performs the following task in sequence:
1. Compute θ t½  via a priority encoder. As discussed in Section 3, format fixed_0_5 is chosen
to represent θ t½  for n ¼ 210; t ¼ 38
 
and n ¼ 211; t ¼ 27
 
, and fixed_0_4 is used for
Value of t θ t½  ¼ 0:θ1θ2θ3θ4θ5ð Þ2
*
θ t½  ¼ 0:θ1θ2θ3θ4ð Þ2
†
22 ≤ t ≤ 38 00000 N/A
11 ≤ t ≤ 21 00001
8 ≤ t ≤ 10 00010 0001
6 ≤ t ≤ 7 00011
t ¼ 5 00100 0010
t ¼ 4 00101
t ¼ 3 00110 0011
t ¼ 2 01001 0100
t ¼ 1 10,000 1000
*This θ t½  is represented in fixed_0_5 form, e.g., θ t½  ¼
P5
i¼1 θi  2
i. This format is used in n ¼ 210; t ¼ 38
 
and
n ¼ 211; t ¼ 27
 
.
†This θ t½  is represented in fixed_0_4 form, e.g., θ t½  ¼
P4
i¼1 θi  2
i. This format is used in n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
, n ¼ 218; t ¼ 9
 
,
and n ¼ 220; t ¼ 8
 
.
Table 3. Encoding of θ t½ .
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n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
, n ¼ 218, t ¼ 9, and n ¼ 220, t ¼ 8. We notice via analysis that for some t, the
values of θ t½  are identical. For instance, θ 6½  ¼ θ 7½  ¼ 0:00011ð Þ2 ¼ 0:09375 in fixed_0_5
format, shown in Table 3. This observation inspires us to exploit priority encoder to
streamline the encoding of θ t½ .
2. Compute n  θ t½  via a fixed-point multiplier. Xilinx LogiCORE IP is configured to imple-
ment high-performance, optimized multipliers for different pairs of n and t. The fractional
part of the multiplication result is truncated, but its integer part is preserved for the next
stage to process.
3. Output the value of d and u. Recall that the value of n  θ t½  must be round to d ¼ 2u.
Another priority encoder is utilized to decode the integer part of n  θ t½ . The detailed
decoding process is structured as lookup table mapping illustrated in Table 4.
Integer part of n  θ t½  Value of d Value of u
nθ t½  > 218 2
19 19
217 < nθ t½  ≤ 218 2
18 18
216 < nθ t½  ≤ 217 2
17 17
215 < nθ t½  ≤ 216 2
16 16
214 < nθ t½  ≤ 215 2
15 15
213 < nθ t½  ≤ 214 2
14 14
212 < nθ t½  ≤ 213 2
13 13
211 < nθ t½  ≤ 212 2
12 12
210 < nθ t½  ≤ 211 2
11 11
29 < nθ t½  ≤ 210 2
10 10
28 < nθ t½  ≤ 29 2
9 9
27 < nθ t½  ≤ 28 2
8 8
26 < nθ t½  ≤ 27 2
7 7
25 < nθ t½  ≤ 26 2
6 6
24 < nθ t½  ≤ 25 2
5 5
23 < nθ t½  ≤ 24 2
4 4
22 < nθ t½  ≤ 23 2
3 3
2 < nθ t½  ≤ 22 2
2 2
1 < nθ t½  ≤ 2 2 1
nθ t½  ≤ 1 1 0
Table 4. Decoding of n  θ t½ .
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Figure 2 depicts our best_d unit. This unit works in three-stage pipelines. It first computes θ t½ 
and then obtains n  θ t½  using a multiplier. Finally, the value of d would be determined by a
priority decoder.
4.2. Bin2CWencoder
Figure 3 overviews the architecture of the proposed constant weight encoder. Input binary
message is passed inward the encoder by means of nonsymmetric 8-to-1 FIFO-read which
exactly imitates the function of read B; 1ð Þ. A serial-in-parallel-out shift register is instantiated
to perform read B; uð Þ, 0 ≤u ≤ log 2
n
2
  	
. The proposed best_d module is exploited here to
calculate the value of d. The values of n, t, and δ are accordingly refreshed using three separate
registers.
4.3. CW2Bin decoder
Figure 4 renders the architecture of the proposed constant weight decoder. A symmetric m-to-
m bit FIFO is used to read the input t-tuple word by word. This logic is indeed the bottleneck
of the constant weight decoder when compared with the encoder. Three registers are utilized
to update the values of n and t as the Bin2CW encoder does, δ. The major difference is that the
shift register here outputs the value of δ bit by bit as step 9 of Algorithm 2 demands.
Figure 3. General architecture of CW encoder.
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5. Integrating with the Niederreiter encryptor
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed Bin2CW encoder can integrate into the
Niederreiter encryptor for data encryption, shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3. Niederreiter Message Encryption, referenced from [25]
Input: message vector m, public key pk ¼{bH ,t} where bH is an n by mt matrix
Output: ciphertext c
1 Bob encodes the message m as a binary matrix/vector of length n and weight at most t.
2 Bob computes the ciphertext as c ¼ bHmT ; mT is the transpose of matrix m.
3 return c.
The Bin2CWencoder performs the first step in Algorithm 3. Note that Bin2CWencoder returns
a t-tuple of integers δ1;…; δtð Þ, which represents the distance between consecutive “1”s in the
Figure 4. General architecture of CWdecoder.
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string. Nevertheless such t-tuple cannot be directly transported to compute the ciphertext. We
believe that the way Heyse et al. [19] encrypts c ¼ bHmT with m ¼ δ1;…; δtð Þ is incorrect due to
two reasons [26]:
1. It is very likely that δi ¼ δj where i 6¼ j such that the number of errors is less than t, and it is
assumed to be insecure for cryptanalysis.
2. δ1;…; δtð Þ returns the integer ranging from 0 to n t, but the constant weight word exactly
ranges from 0 to n. In other terms, the last t rows of the public key bHT are never used.
To correct this weakness from [19], we propose to generate the “real” constant weight binary
words of length n and Hamming weight t. Assume the constant weight is represented by
i1;…; itð Þ, the coordinates of the “1”s in ascending order, then i1 ¼ δ1, i2 ¼ δ2 þ i1 þ 1,…, and
it ¼ δt þ it1 þ 1 are computed as the input of the second step, Algorithm 3.
Figure 5 illustrates our revision of Niederreiter encryption unit on the basis of [19]. The public
key bHT is stored in an internal BRAM and row-wise addressed by the 11-bit register. Two 11-
bit integer adders are instantiated to transform δ1;…; δtð Þ to i1;…; itð Þ which are eventually
stored in the 11-bit register. The vector–matrix multiplication in step 2, Algorithm 3, is equiv-
alent to XOR operation of the selected rows of bHT , which can be implemented as a GF 2297 
adder in this figure. It is also worth noting that the vector–matrix multiplication works con-
currently with the CW encoding: Whenever a valid ik has been computed, it is transferred
immediately to the GF 2297
 
adder for summing up the selected row. Once the last it has been
Figure 5. Block diagram of the Niederreiter encryptor.
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computed, the last indexed row of bH
T
also has been accumulated to the sum. This sum, stored
in the 297-bit register, is now available to be interpreted as the ciphertext.
Our final remark is for the side channel attacks of code-based crypto using constant weight
encoding (CWE). Admittedly, we cannot give a satisfying answer of them at the time being. We
believe this is an open problem left to be solved. For the time being, if the users decide not to
take the risk of timing attacks, we suggest forcing the CWE to be constant time. We can set the
maximum time (it happens when we have all-zero input) for whatever the input is. Neverthe-
less, the price is a significant drop of timing performance.
We give here our analysis of timing attacks: The attackers can compromise the CWE if and
only if he could analyze the timing differences among different inputs and use this informa-
tion to recover the entire message. Unfortunately, the timing character of the operation of
reading “1” or “0” is different: when reading “1,” it consumes only 1 clock cycle count,
whereas when reading “1,” it continues to read log 2 dð Þd e more bits from B, consuming
1þ log 2 dð Þd e counts. These behaviors appear at first sight to be vulnerable to timing attacks:
For different inputs, the execution time is slightly different, and the distinction between
reading “0” and reading “1” is also significant. However, statistical approaches as [27, 28]
have introduced against RSA cryptosystems which seem to be not helpful: To our way of
thinking, the situation we encounter is much more difficult. (1) We need to recover this
particular message under attack, but the timing differences among different messages that
we collect do not leak any useful information on the targeted message. On the contrary, in
RSA we can use a large number of messages and compare the timing for recovering the
secret key in a bit-by-bit fashion. (2) Note that d is changing each iteration according to the
current state of n and t. That is to say, when reading “1,” the timing is variable, sensitive to
how “1” and “0” are permuted in the message and thus difficult to predict. Most impor-
tantly, even if CWE is somehow compromised, it does not reveal any information about
secret keys. In the case of decryption, the ciphertext is first decrypted by an error correcting
decoder (typically, Goppa-code or MDPC-code decoder) which holds the secret key. The
result after error correcting is a GF 2nð Þ vector, and then this vector is encoded by CWE for
the plaintext recovered. We can see the key points here: Timing attacks should be mounted
on error correcting decoders rather than constant weight decoders for retrieving the secret
keys. Perhaps a better strategy is to mount timing attacks on CWE for recovering the
plaintext directly. This raises one more question: how do we distinguish or measure the
peculiar timing of CWE out of the total execution time, given that error correcting decoders
also take nonconstant time for decoding? This is indeed a very exciting topic for which we
would investigate in our future work.
6. Results and comparisons
We captured our constant weight coding architecture in the Verilog language and prototyped
our design on Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA (Table 5). The reason why we did our experiments on
Xilinx Virtex-6 is principally about a convention. Recent progress in FPGA implementations of
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Algorithm Platform Area
[slices]
Memory blocks
[36 + 18 kb RAM]
Frequency
[MHz]
Throughout
[Mbps]
Coding
efficiency
(a) n = 210, t = 38
This work Bin2CW, new
approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
74 0 + 1 330 160.2 97.89%
CW2Bin, new
approx.
79 0 + 1 330 148.1
Heyse
et al. [19]
Bin2CW,
Heyse’s approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
110 0 + 1 310 178.8 91.44%
CW2Bin,
Heyse’s approx.
88 0 + 1 310 162.1
(b) n = 211, t = 27
This work Bin2CW, new
approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
91 0 + 1 350 187.2 96.41%
CW2Bin, new
approx.
95 0 + 1 340 168.6
Heyse
et al. [19]
Bin2CW,
Heyse’s approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
118 0 + 1 340 208.4 93.78%
CW2Bin,
Heyse’s approx.
110 0 + 1 340 164.6
Sendrier
[17]*
Bin2CW,
original
Intel
Pentium 4
— — 2400 17.3 95.51%
Bin2CW,
approximate
33.0 92.11%
(c) n = 216, t = 9
This work Bin2CW, new
approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
103 0 + 1 440 316.1 97.20%
CW2Bin, new
approx.
109 0 + 1 310 212.9
Heyse
et al. [19]
Bin2CW,
Heyse’s approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
90 10 + 3 240 182.3 92.68%
CW2Bin,
Heyse’s approx.
90 10 + 3 230 170.3
Sendrier
[17]
Bin2CW,
original
Intel
Pentium 4
— — 2400 18.3 99.50%
Bin2CW,
approximate
22.0 93.84%
(d) n = 218, t = 9
This work Bin2CW, new
approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
138 0 + 1 410 295.5 97.31%
CW2Bin, new
approx.
118 0 + 1 320 219.5
Heyse
et al. [19]
Bin2CW,
Heyse’s approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
94 40 + 3 170 106.0 92.81%
CW2Bin,
Heyse’s approx.
93 40 + 3 180 104.9
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code-based cryptography accept Virtex-6 or even lower ends for implementation aspects [19,
29–32]. The benefit of using Virtex-6 from our standpoint is that we could fairly compare our
design with others given that most of them are also implemented on Virtex-6. To the best of
our knowledge, the only compact implementations of constant weight coding have been
proposed by Heyse et al. [19]. Their lightweight architecture is generally identical to ours
except the design of best_d module. Their best_d module works in two pipeline stages: In the
first stage, it retrieves the value of u by table lookup. Then in the second stage, it outputs d
according to the value of u using a simple decoder. Comparatively, our best_d module has
three stages of the pipeline, and thus it leads to a lower throughput, but our architectures are
smaller and improve the area-time tradeoff of the constant weight coding implementations
proposed by Heyse et al. [19], shown in Table 5. In particular, we use only one 18 kb memory
block for all parameter sets of our experiments.
We also observe that in our designs, the memory footprint does not increase, and the high clock
frequency also maintains as the parameters grow. This is because the main difference among
encoders or decoders with distinct parameters n and t is the data width of multiplier embedded in
the best_d module, which increases logarithmically from 10bit 5bit to 20bit 4bit. On the other
hand, the memory overhead of Heyse’s implementations grows linearly with n and might intro-
duce problems when n is large as aforementioned. To verify this argument, we re-implemented
Heyse’s work for n ¼ 216; t ¼ 9
 
, n ¼ 218; t ¼ 9
 
, and n ¼ 220; t ¼ 8
 
. The experimental results
validate this point. Additionally, another negative side effect of heavy memory overhead is that
the working frequency of circuits drops rapidly as shown in Table 6. For small parameters (a) and
(b), the lookup table in Heyse’s design could be made of distributed memory (LUT) and therefore
has little impact on frequency. However, for large parameters (c), (d), and (e), such lookup table
can no longer be instantiated as LUTs because Xilinx Virtex-6 distributed memory generator only
allows maximum data depth of 6,5536. We instead use block memory resource of the FPGAs to
construct the table, and this accordingly hinders speed performance due to relatively far and
complicated routing. The usage of block memory is the real bottleneck of Heyse’s work as n
grows.
Algorithm Platform Area
[slices]
Memory blocks
[36 + 18 kb RAM]
Frequency
[MHz]
Throughout
[Mbps]
Coding
efficiency
(e) n = 220, t = 8
This work Bin2CW, new
approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
156 0 + 1 370 284.9 97.31%
CW2Bin, new
approx.
122 0 + 1 300 222.7
Heyse
et al. [19]
Bin2CW,
Heyse’s approx.
Xilinx
xc6vlx240t
124 160 + 3 130 96.6 76.07%
CW2Bin,
Heyse’s approx.
125 160 + 3 130 98.8
*Sendrier implemented a different but very close parameter set n = 211, t = 30. We also put it here for reference.
Table 5. Compact implementations of CW encoder and decoder on Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA.
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We finally implemented the Niederreiter encryptor, a cryptographic application where con-
stant weight coding is used exactly as described in Section 5. Table 6 compares our work with
the state of art [19, 26]. It is seen that our new implementation is the most compact, with better
area-time tradeoffs. The same amount of block memory is occupied in our design as [19] did
where 16 36kb + 1 18kb RAMs are utilized to save the public-key matrix bH and one 18 kb
RAM for the 8-to-1 FIFO within the constant weight encoder.
7. Conclusion
A new approach for determining the optimal value d in constant weight coding is proposed in
this chapter. This method innovates a more compact yet efficient architecture for constant
weight encoder and decoder in resource-constrained computing systems. Afterward, we
exploited this new encoder to implement the Niederreiter encryptor on a Xilinx device. Exper-
iments show that our work competes for the state of art and works better in terms of both
RAM usage and processing throughput for large parameters.
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